

PERTEVMUN'26

Historical International Atomic Energy Agency Study Guide

Agenda Item:

*Drafting an International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and the Establishment of an International Verification Regime*

Under Secretary General:

Hamza Gezersu

Academic Assistant:

Ayşin Kalafat

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	2
1. Letter from Secretary-General.....	3
2. Letter from Under-Secretary-General.....	4
3. Introduction to the Committee: International Atomic Energy Agency.....	5
4. Introduction to the Agenda Item.....	6
5. Key Terminology.....	8
6. Historical Overview.....	10
Beginning of the Nuclear Age.....	10
The Cuban Missile Crisis and Global Nuclear Fear.....	11
Cold War Arms Race.....	12
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963).....	13
7. The Issue of Nuclear Proliferation.....	14
Risks of Across-Continental Proliferation.....	14
Security Dilemmas.....	14
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy versus Military Diversions.....	15
8. Designing a Verification Regime.....	15
Role of the IAEA Safeguards System.....	16
Procedures and Requirements of a Regime.....	17
Handling Violations and Non-Compliance.....	19
9. Major Parties Involved.....	21
Non-Proliferation Obligations and Disarmament Commitments.....	22
Safeguarding and Verification of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.....	23
Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons.....	24
Historical Background.....	25
Current Status and Developments (1965–1969).....	25
Security Concerns and Global Stability.....	25
Verification and Compliance Mechanisms.....	26
Legal Framework and Treaty Obligations.....	26
Diplomatic Efforts and Negotiations.....	26
Preventing Proliferation and Promoting Cooperation.....	26
Humanitarian and Ethical Considerations.....	27
The Role of External Actors.....	27
12. References.....	28

1. Letter from Secretary-General

ESTEEMED DELEGATES AND DISTINGUISHED GUESTS,

ON BEHALF OF THE WHOLE PERTEVMUN FAMILY, AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL, IT IS MY GREAT HONOR AND PLEASURE TO WELCOME YOU TO THE THIRD ANNUAL SESSION OF PERTEVMUN.

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO OUR AMAZING ORGANIZATION TEAM AND ASTONISHING ACADEMIC TEAM FOR THEIR HARD WORK AND GREAT EFFORT. THANKS TO EVERYONE'S DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT, WE PREPARED YOU 12 COMMITTEES FOR YOU, WHICH INCLUDE TWO GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES, SEVEN SPECIAL COMMITTEES, AND THREE CRISIS COMMITTEES. THE COMMON GROUND OF ALL OF THESE COMMITTEES IS TO ENCOURAGE YOU TO DEBATE OR ACT UPON EITHER HISTORICAL, CURRENT, OR FUTURISTIC ISSUES AND GLOBAL TOPICS TO BROADEN YOUR PERSPECTIVES.

I HOPE FOR THE DURATION OF PERTEVMUN'26, ALL THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE ONE OF THE MOST SPECTACULAR EXPERIENCES OF THEIR LIVES FILLED WITH TEAMWORK, NEW FRIENDSHIPS AND UNFORGETTABLE MEMORIES.

#LIVEFORTHEAPPLAUSE

SINCERELY,

ELA KARABATI

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF PERTEVMUN'26

2. Letter from Under-Secretary-General

Esteemed delegates,

It is a great honour to welcome you all to our committee, Historical International Atomic Energy Agency (H-IAEA), regarding the agenda item of “Drafting an International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Establishment of an International Verification Regime”! It is Hamza Gezersu, your Under-Secretary-General, who is a 10th-grade IBDP student at Vefa High School.

First of all, our Academic Assistant Ayşin Kalafat and I put a lot of effort into preparing this committee. This study guide includes the most principal and fundamental matters regarding our agenda item. Please read this document and give attention to the cornerstone information. Furthermore, I would like you to search beyond this study guide regarding your country's stances in order to gain more professional and ambidextrous data towards getting ready for the committee.

Secondly, our committee will conduct the Harvard Procedure as a “special semi-committee”. That means the debate will be mainly based on the procedure; nonetheless, the crisis updates will be integrated into our committee during the proceedings of the conference. Therefore, you should be prepared, especially for the years 1965-1969, with the aim of being acquainted with information regarding significant events that happened during these years. During the updates, you will need to take action in the interest of taking precaution or generating enforcements; meanwhile, you should also be aware of the historical background of the events. Generally, the committee will continue with both procedure and crisis in balance. We are planning to have fruitful debates, thrilling crises, glorious management skills, and sustainable resolutions that would shape the flow of history regarding the future of nuclear matters with your determination.

The beginning date of our committee will be declared to you after the entire opening speeches. You may address general historical background and your country's point of view before the time update for your opening speeches. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via my e-mail address below.

Finally, I would like to thank you for all your struggles during your preparation process. This committee will be materialized with your participation; thus, you are the stars of the committee, and I am looking forward to meeting with you at the conference.

Hamza Gezersu

Under Secretary General of the Historical Atomic Energy Agency

hamzagezersu@gmail.com

3. Introduction to the Committee: International Atomic Energy Agency

The United Nations System founded an autonomous organization that specialized in matters of atomic energy under global circumstances in 1957. Followingly, this committee was named as the “International Atomic Energy Agency” whose headquarters were located in Vienna, Austria. This committee has over 170 countries as members, which are also members of the United Nations. Every country has equal rights under the framework of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

This committee was generated for the purpose of responding to widening global concern over the spread of nuclear weapons after World War II. Furthermore, one of the principal goals of this committee was to recognize the benefits of nuclear energy in medicine, energy production, agriculture, and science. Therefore, the conclusion of the debates during the session of this committee was aimed at integrating the structure of nuclear energy in the most peaceful and fair way towards utilizing the advantages of these systems in ambidextrous improvement areas globally.



The main functions of this committee can be listed as:

Nuclear Safeguards & Non-Proliferation

- Monitoring nuclear programs worldwide with the aim of ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted for weapons development via conducting inspections, using surveillance, satellite imagery, and material accounting; promoting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Nuclear Safety & Security

- Defending people and the environment by reaktör safety, radioactive waste management, emergency preparedness, such as nuclear accidents, and protection against nuclear terrorism.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Science

- Applying nuclear technology for development via medicine as cancer diagnosis and radiotherapy, agriculture as pest control and food preservation, water resources as isotope hydrology, energy as support for safe Nuclear power programs

The International Atomic Energy Agency matters due to its critical balancing role for the future of the world in nuclear matters. This committee is being operated with the hopes of encouraging scientific and economic benefits of nuclear technology, taking precautions for nuclear weapons proliferation, and reinforcing global trust and transparency. Further, the significance of this committee is being displayed in monitoring sensitive nuclear programs and giving responses to safety crises.

During the honorable session of PERTEVMUN'26 Conference, the committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency will be aiming to materialize the historical session for the major agenda item: Drafting an International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Establishment of an International Verification Regime.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item: Drafting an International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Establishment of an International Verification Regime

During the middle of the 20th century, the development of nuclear weapons fundamentally impacted global security. Following, the use of atomic bombs during World War II in Japan, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear technology rapidly generated an association not only with scientific advancement but also with unprecedented destructive capability. In subsequent history, more countries gained access to nuclear technology during the early Cold War era. Therefore, the international community raised concerns regarding the possibility of widespread nuclear weapons proliferation.

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation remained a principal global security issue, even though the primary initiatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Owing to that reason, particular states ensured reinforcement for their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, the proposed agenda item for this committee addresses the urgent need for a comprehensive and ambidextrous international treaty that limits the spread of nuclear weapons, while allowing states in order to benefit from peace and fair nuclear technologies. Furthermore, the one major goal is to facilitate an international verification regime that will have the potential to supply transparency, accountability, and compliance among participating

countries. It is also essential to build trust between nations and ensure that treaty commitments are upheld via verification mechanisms such as inspections, monitoring systems, and reporting requirements.



Overall, nuclear non-proliferation is one of the main problems under global security circumstances. Thus, collaboration between countries requires maintaining stability and preventing nuclear conflict. The international community should be obligated to improve influential legal frameworks and qualified monitoring mechanisms.

5. Key Terminology

Non-Proliferation: It basically means preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries. It also means keeping nuclear technology under control.

Disarmament: It means decreasing the use of nuclear weapons or completely eliminating nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon states support gradual disarmament.

Nuclear Deterrence: Using nuclear weapons as a tool to prevent aggression with other states by demonstrating their power, a strategy based on the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Verification Regime: It is the system that monitors whether agreements are being complied with. Maintains this question: Is a country secretly developing nuclear weapons or not? It needs the permission of the countries in some situations. There are no automatic sanctions for violations.

Safeguards: This is the inspection system implemented by the IAEA.

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA): This is a basic inspection agreement that a country signs with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Countries that signed this must report all their nuclear weapons, all their nuclear facilities, and must accept the inspections of the IAEA. The IAEA can only inspect facilities that the country has declared.

Additional Protocol: Gives the IAEA expanded powers. With this protocol, the countries that have signed must report their research activities about their nuclear industry. The IAEA can make spot checks, and it will have the authority to investigate unreported areas and get environmental samples.

Withdrawal Clause: According to Article 10 of NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), countries can withdraw by saying their national interests are threatened, as North Korea did.

Nuclear Umbrella Security: A nuclear umbrella security refers to a system where a nuclear-armed state pledges to use its nuclear deterrent to defend its allies in the event of a nuclear attack. This system aims to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-armed states and simultaneously reduce their motivation to develop nuclear weapons.

Nuclear sharing: It is the practice of nuclear-armed countries storing these weapons in non-nuclear-armed countries in peacetime, planning to use them in wartime. The sharing of nuclear weapons is a contentious point within the NPT, as the NPT strongly rejects the idea of handing nuclear weapons over to another country.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): A strategic security concept that argues that if two or more nuclear powers have the capacity to completely destroy each other, the parties will refrain from initiating nuclear war.

Non-Compliance : Violating the treaty's obligations, it can potentially result in sanctions or international action.

Sanctions: Penalties imposed, usually through the United Nations Security Council, as a result of violations of international law.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs): Actions that are taken to reduce mistrust between states.

NPT(Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons): The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

TPNW(Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons): It is the first international treaty to completely ban the testing, operation, and possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon states think that the TPNW is the opposite of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and weakens deterrence.

6. Historical Overview

Beginning of the Nuclear Age

The Nuclear Age started with the United States which dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945. This action caused the deaths of many civilians and resulted in radioactivity persisting for years, poisoning people in Hiroshima. It didn't only affect the area in Japan, the bomb's radioactivity also spread to other nearby countries. In this way, genetic disorders, dangerous diseases, and many other things persisted for years, not only in Japan but also in other neighboring countries.


This situation showed the destructive power of nuclear weapons to the whole world and changed the perspective of post-war international security concepts completely. The first nuclear weapon, the atomic bomb of the United States, also caused a technology race between countries because countries saw that nuclear weapons can be extremely strong weapons in wars and the need to be prepared.



This period highlighted the desire of nations to possess nuclear capabilities and the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Global Nuclear Fear

In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred when the Soviet Union secretly installed nuclear missiles in Cuba during the Cold War. This event is also a significant element of the Cold War between the United States and Russia. The crisis continued for 13 days, and it caused worldwide fear. The Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba. The United States viewed this as a threat from the Soviet Union because Cuba was geographically very close to the United States, and the Cold War's conditions at the time were compelling. Also, these missiles were so powerful that they could even bomb cities of the United States in seconds.



At one of the most critical moments of the crisis, the Soviet and American navies were practically on the verge of clashing, leading to fears of a possible nuclear war. Therefore, this event is considered one of the peak moments of the Cold War.

This crisis demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not merely a regional weapon; they also represent a major problem threatening global security.

As a result of these events, the danger of nuclear war has been seen and discussions and meetings have begun on the importance of limiting nuclear weapons. It was understood that negotiations between states were necessary and that attention should be paid to nuclear arms control.

Cold War Arms Race

The Cold War arms race was a competition that highlighted arms tensions, particularly nuclear tensions, between the Soviet Union and the United States. It occurred between 1947 and 1991, after World War Two. Both sides wanted to be more powerful than the other in the nuclear industry, so they started to create new nuclear weapons, and the arms race also included transport systems, ballistic missiles, submarine-based weapons, and powerful hydrogen bombs.

The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction emerged, and countries tried to avoid using nuclear weapons out of fear of destruction, but this also influenced states to turn to nuclear weapons as a tool of threat.



In the 1960s and 70s, the US and the Soviet Union had made significant advancements in nuclear weapons technology. This created widespread fear around the world and made crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis even more dangerous.

As a conclusion, throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons became not only a weapon of war but also a deterrent, a defensive rationale that prevented direct nuclear conflict between major powers but also encouraged an arms race.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)

The Partial Test Ban Treaty is an international agreement that imposes certain restrictions on nuclear weapons testing and permits it only in specific environments. The Partial Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space, and underwater, but it allowed underground nuclear tests. So it wasn't a complete prohibition. These restrictions were due to the fact that nuclear fallout from nuclear tests in the atmosphere, oceans, and space could spread throughout the world.



This treaty aimed to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, decrease radiation risk, secure human health, slow down the nuclear arms race, and also to support international collaboration. This treaty also showed that there could be diplomatic ways to support collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this paved the way for other diplomatic agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and others.

Furthermore, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, in subsequent years, formed the basis for more comprehensive and binding nuclear power control agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

7. The Issue of Nuclear Proliferation

The issue of nuclear proliferation is one of the biggest problems of international security. If nuclear weapons spread through different countries, a real crisis can turn into bigger ones, like global crises. Because of this fact, proliferation should be prevented to not cause global issues that can affect humanity's continuation and international war risks.

Risks of Across-Continental Proliferation

Proliferation of nuclear weapons across continents can be a dangerous risk for international security. With this spread of nuclear weapons, it can also damage confidence-building measures, some articles of treaties, and deterrence relations between states, so this situation causes

- transformation of regional arms races into global competition
- increasing difficulty of control and verification mechanisms due to geographical limitations
- increasing risk of nuclear technology or materials being transferred to interstate or non-state actors

Importance: IAEA can have hard times when developing comprehensive and internationally applicable inspection systems.

Security Dilemmas

Nuclear proliferation is highly connected with security dilemmas because when one state mentions that it has developed new nuclear weapons, other states can see this as a possible threat to them. This situation can end up with;

- cascading proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- decrease of trust mechanism around states,
- addiction to nuclear deterrence.

Importance: This situation shows that prevention of proliferation must be done with diplomacy, precautions which increase trust and collective security mechanisms. Furthermore, the United Nations can have an important role in this.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy versus Military Diversions

Nuclear energy is not only about war, crisis, etc. It also helps humanity in medicine, producing electricity, and other technological developments. In short, it has bad ways and good ways to use. To secure the goodwill of nuclear developments, international laws grant states the right to use nuclear energy.

Some of the main benefits of peaceful usage of nuclear energy:

- Securing energy security by producing a high amount of electricity
- Helping with the cure to cancer and other medical researches
- Supporting technological and scientific development movements

But nuclear energy also creates weapons that are dangerous and deadly. Especially, uranium enrichment and plutonium production are dual-use technologies that can serve both civilian and military purposes. So at this point, transparency and inspections are very important, and these jobs continue with agencies like the IAEA.

Importance: Nuclear energy can also help with scientific and technological developments, but we shouldn't forget that transparency and oversight are essential to ensure that these peaceful methods do not deviate from their intended purpose and instead become military weapons.

8. Designing a Verification Regime

During the years of the 1940s-1950s, early nuclear concerns were included in international relations. After World War II, the emerging Cold War intensified fears of nuclear proliferation. Some states struggled for the purpose of arranging international frameworks with the hope of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons internationally. However, the acceptance of these frameworks was not very successful due to the controversial politics of the time.

For instance, the Baruch Plan was proposed by the United States of America (USA) in 1946. The major aim of this plan was to take precautions against nuclear proliferation in the

wake of World War II. It was represented to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); nevertheless, rejected by the Soviet Union (USSR). Moscow viewed this plan as a means for the government of the United States to maintain dominance, not demanding immediate nuclear disarmament. In fact, the Soviet Union responded to this plan by leading to the first Soviet atomic test in 1949, against all the previous nuclear actions of the United States of America. Therefore, the idea of international verification was committed by the international community; however, it lacked collaboration and integrity among all countries.

Role of the IAEA Safeguards System

Nuclear technology began expanding for energy and research purposes. Therefore, the International Atomic Energy Agency improved the Safeguards System with the intention of ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful matters to nuclear weapons programs. That process materialized with the foundation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These safeguards involve monitoring nuclear materials, verifying state declarations, and conducting inspections of nuclear facilities. This system was aimed to become the first structured international verification legal framework for nuclear activities.

The safeguards system was made from a practical mechanism:

- *Declarations:* That process states the entire report on nuclear materials and facilities.
- *Inspections:* The professional and authorized personnel from the International Atomic Energy Agency supervise nuclear facilities to verify “declarations”.
- *Material Accounting:* This process expresses tracking nuclear materials throughout their lifecycle.
- *Monitoring Technologies:* Specialized cameras, seals, sensors, and environmental sampling are supplied by the International Atomic Energy Agency in collaboration with the United Nations towards security measures.

As an overall consequence, the safeguards system maintains the technical foundation for international nuclear verification. This assists in bridging trust and transparency between states. This situation promotes the enforcement of nuclear non-proliferation agreements. However, before the establishment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the global impact of safeguards systems was not influential everywhere. *Therefore, during the session of our committee, you ought to guarantee the continuity and sustainability, and improve the current conditions of these safeguard systems in detail.*

Procedures and Requirements of a Regime

During the Cold War period, the international community raised concerns, and the administrators of countries addressed problems regarding nuclear matters. Therefore, the International Atomic Energy Agency recognized that treaties required clear procedural frameworks with the aim of ensuring compliance. These procedural frameworks should be ensured with all members of the committee in order to maintain global nuclear security. Especially, the whole mechanism parts of the procedure have the potential to be generated, whether the member states give permission for all procedural requirements towards a possible treaty, which is the major purpose of our committee.

Mandatory Declarations of Nuclear Materials and Facilities

A fundamental requirement of a nuclear verification regime is that all member states have to fully declare their nuclear capabilities in transparent ways to public opinion. This condition includes providing detailed information about nuclear materials, research facilities, reactors, enrichment plants, and fuel-cycle activities. The primary goal of these declarations is to generate a correct baseline that international inspectors are able to verify compliance.

Regular Inspection Procedures

To substantiate the precision of state declarations, a verification regime ought to establish systematic inspection over the flow of nuclear materials. These inspectors should be chosen by the administrator of the member countries in collaboration with the United Nations (UN), who are fully professionalized regarding the inspection procedures. Inspectors need to be authorized by the entire governments of member states for the purpose of visiting declared nuclear facilities and assessing whether nuclear materials are being used in accordance with their obligations.

Inspection procedures may typically include:

- *Routine Inspections*: Conducted at scheduled intervals in order to verify records and physical inventories of nuclear materials.
- *Ad Hoc Inspections*: Occurred when facilities are declared or when unusual inconsistencies appear in reporting data.
- *Special Inspections*: Requested when inspectors suspect any undeclared nuclear activities.

Nuclear Material Accounting and Control

One of the essential procedural requirements is the establishment of nuclear material accounting systems. Member countries must track nuclear substances, such as uranium and plutonium, through their matter lifecycle, in their whole progress, from production, enrichment, storage, and consumption.

This process may involve:

- Measuring the quantity and composition of nuclear materials.
- Recording transfers between facilities.
- Reporting inventories to the international verification authority.

Monitoring through Verification Technologies

Modern verification technologies rely heavily on advanced technological monitoring systems. These technologies give permission to inspectors with the aim of observing nuclear activities continuously and detecting suspicious behavior even between inspection procedures.

Common verification tools include:

- Surveillance cameras are placed inside nuclear facilities.
- Seals are attached to storage containers to prevent unauthorized access.
- Radiation detectors that monitor nuclear materials.
- Environmental sampling techniques capable of detecting microscopic traces of nuclear activity.
- Satellite imagery that allows professionals to monitor facility construction or expansion remotely.

These technological verification methods are notably important in the aftermath of several confidential cases in nuclear activity, which revealed the limitations of traditional inspections. These innovations should also reinforce the international community's ability to detect undeclared nuclear programs.

Reporting and Review Mechanisms

Verification regimes ought to establish regular reporting obligations in the interest of ensuring continued transparency and accountability among all participating states. Governments have to periodically submit reports elaborating their nuclear activities, while including all details regarding facility operations, material capabilities, and technological improvements.

Furthermore, many regimes incorporate review mechanisms such as periodic conferences or evaluation meetings with authorized representatives of member states, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the United Nations (UN). These gatherings allow member states to estimate the influence of the verification regime, address emerging technological challenges, and renovate verification procedures when necessary.

Handling Violations and Non-Compliance

In the process of materializing a verification regime regarding nuclear matters, any violations or non-adherence should be terminated for the purpose of maintaining global security against nuclear concerns and sustaining the peaceful uses of nuclear substances.

The detection of irregularities or suspicious activities is one of the cornerstones of procedures. Violations have to be identified through routine inspections, abruptness in nuclear material accounting, satellite observation, or environmental sampling.

Once a potential violation is detected, the verification authority must initiate formal investigation and clarification procedures. These steps of procedures should be designed in order to determine whether the suspicious activity represents a genuine breach of debate obligations or a technical discrepancy.

The investigation process may generally involve:

- Requesting detailed explanations from the state concerned.
- Examining additional documentation related to nuclear materials or facilities.
- Conducting further inspections of relevant sites.

Under some case conditions, inspectors may request special or expanded inspections in order to verify undeclared activities. These investigative powers should evolve over time, whether international institutions struggle for the purpose of dealing with nuclear compliance issues with further information.

If investigations confirm that a state or a community violated the obligations under a nuclear treaty, the verification authority has to formally determine that a non-compliance has occurred. This determination should be based on evidence that is collected by inspections, monitoring technologies, and material accounting records. The determination ought to be proposed for the purpose of creating the international verified report of violations and informing public opinion, meanwhile taking immediate precautions under suitable circumstances against violation issues.

The international community should initially attempt to resolve violations via diplomatic negotiations and political dialogue. Diplomatic engagement may include:

- Negotiations between the violating state or community and international authorities.
- Confidence-building measures.
- Agreements to restore compliance with verification requirements.

These diplomatic responses should aim to encourage countries to return to compliance voluntarily. Therefore, international relations may avoid escalation or confrontation on matters of nuclear substances. If diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the violation, the international community may consult enforcement mechanisms. These measures may be designed to force the violating state or community to comply with its debate obligations. Possible enforcement actions may include:

- Economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
- Restrictions on nuclear technology transfers and international cooperation.
- Suspension of participation in international nuclear programs.

Such measures have the potential to serve both as punishment for violations and as deterrence against future non-compliance by any other countries. After the aftermath of cases of non-compliance, improvements in verification systems should be generated by the international community. Thus, violations not only trigger enforcement actions but also contribute to the evolution and strengthening of global nuclear governance mechanisms.

9. Major Parties Involved

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): An agency that aims to supervise the nuclear actions of countries. IAEA can't check a country's actions in the nuclear industry if the country doesn't allow it.

United Nations(UN): An organization that aims to maintain international peace and security, promote human rights, and support economic and social development. It is the most comprehensive international organization in the world. The NPT operates within the framework of the UN.

United Nations Security Council: It is the main agency of the United Nations that is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. The Council promotes diplomatic rapprochement in situations threatening the peace, may impose economic sanctions if necessary, and may authorize the use of military force.

Nuclear Weapons States (NWS): Countries that are recognized under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as having manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon. These states' main aim was to keep their strategic value by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries. According to the NPT, only 5 countries are official nuclear-weapon states:

- United States of America
- Russia
- United Kingdom
- France
- China

Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS): Countries that have committed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons under the NPT. These states were concerned that the treaty would create a permanent power imbalance and grant privileges to states that have nuclear weapons.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): An international organization formed by countries that did not join any superpower bloc. It emerged during the Cold War. They had an impact on: the recognition of the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a right, equal and non-discriminatory oversight systems, and real and measurable disarmament actions by nuclear powers.

Cold War Security Alliances – NATO & Warsaw Pact: These alliances played a major role in determining the balance of power behind the negotiations. Debates on deterrence and strategic balance have been conducted through these alliances. Also, especially in NATO, the Nuclear Umbrella System is being used.

10. Key Treaty Components for Negotiation

Non-Proliferation Obligations and Disarmament Commitments

Within the framework of negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, delegates are required to define clear and enforceable obligations that address both the prevention of nuclear weapons spread and long-term disarmament objectives. These discussions take place in response to growing international concern over nuclear expansion in the context of the Cold War, where the increasing number of states with nuclear capability poses a direct threat to global stability and security.

Delegates must establish non-proliferation obligations for non-nuclear-weapon states, ensuring that such states commit to refraining from developing, acquiring, or receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These states are also expected to accept international verification measures and ensure that all nuclear activities remain strictly for peaceful purposes, including energy production, scientific research, and medical applications. A robust compliance framework is required to guarantee that civilian nuclear programs are not diverted for military use. At the same time, the treaty must define the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon states. These states are expected to commit not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear states in their development. Additionally, they must undertake binding obligations to pursue negotiations in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, establishing a clear long-term commitment to reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear arsenals.

A central issue for delegates is achieving a balanced structure between non-proliferation and disarmament commitments. Non-nuclear-weapon states seek assurances that the treaty does not permanently institutionalize nuclear inequality, while nuclear-weapon states emphasize the priority of preventing further proliferation as an immediate security concern. The treaty framework must therefore reflect a negotiated compromise that addresses both security imperatives and equity concerns. To ensure compliance with these obligations, delegates must incorporate a verification mechanism under the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is responsible for monitoring nuclear activities, verifying state declarations, and ensuring adherence to peaceful-use commitments.

Consequently, this component of the treaty establishes the foundational legal structure for global nuclear governance, defining both immediate binding restrictions and long-term objectives for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Safeguarding and Verification of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Within the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, delegates must establish a strong and credible system to ensure that all peaceful nuclear cooperation is not diverted toward the development of nuclear weapons. This component is central to maintaining trust between states that seek access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes and those concerned about proliferation risks in the context of the Cold War nuclear environment.

States participating in peaceful nuclear cooperation are required to place all relevant nuclear materials and facilities under international safeguards. This includes the obligation to declare nuclear material inventories, production facilities, and fuel-cycle activities in a transparent and verifiable manner. Such declarations form the basis for international oversight and allow verification authorities to assess whether nuclear activities remain consistent with peaceful purposes. Verification is conducted through a structured system implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is responsible for ensuring that nuclear material is not diverted to military use. This includes regular inspections of declared facilities, material accountancy checks, and the use of monitoring technologies such as surveillance systems, seals, and environmental sampling. Delegates must ensure that these verification measures are sufficiently robust to detect both declared and undeclared nuclear activities.

A key requirement under negotiation is that all states engaged in nuclear cooperation must accept legally binding safeguards agreements as a condition of receiving nuclear materials, technology, or technical assistance. These agreements are intended to ensure that international cooperation in nuclear energy does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. Delegates must also define mechanisms for strengthening verification in cases of ambiguity or concern. This may include additional inspection rights, expanded access to information, and the use of advanced monitoring tools. The credibility of peaceful nuclear cooperation depends on the ability of the verification system to respond effectively to potential risks without obstructing legitimate civilian nuclear development.

In consequence, safeguarding and verification mechanisms are designed to balance two essential objectives: promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensuring that such cooperation does not undermine international peace and security.

Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons

Within the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, delegates must address the sensitive issue of how nuclear weapons may be withdrawn, reduced, and ultimately eliminated in a controlled and verifiable manner. This provision is essential to ensuring that the treaty not only prevents future proliferation but also contributes to long-term global disarmament goals in the context of the Cold War, where nuclear arsenals continue to expand and destabilize international security.

Nuclear-weapon states are expected to commit to gradual and systematic reductions of their existing nuclear arsenals. This includes establishing clear pathways for dismantling nuclear warheads, decommissioning delivery systems, and securely managing fissile materials. Such withdrawal processes must be designed in a way that ensures irreversible reduction of nuclear capabilities while maintaining strategic stability during the transition period. A key requirement for any withdrawal mechanism is verification and transparency. All steps in the reduction process must be subject to international monitoring to ensure that dismantled nuclear weapons are not secretly retained or redeployed. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays a central role in verifying that nuclear materials from dismantled weapons are properly accounted for and placed under peaceful-use safeguards or secure storage arrangements.

Delegates must also define procedures for reporting and documenting reductions, including regular disclosures of nuclear stockpiles and dismantlement activities. This ensures that the withdrawal process remains transparent and builds confidence among non-nuclear-weapon states that disarmament commitments are being implemented in good faith. Furthermore, the treaty framework should include provisions for continued negotiations on further reductions, with the long-term objective of achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament. This reflects the principle that withdrawal is not a single action, but an ongoing process that requires sustained international cooperation and political commitment.

Finally, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons provisions is designed to complement non-proliferation obligations by ensuring that existing nuclear arsenals are not permanently legitimized, but instead progressively reduced under strict international supervision.

11. Questions to be Addressed

Historical Background

- What key developments following World War II, particularly the use of nuclear weapons and the emergence of nuclear powers, shaped early international attitudes toward nuclear proliferation?
 - How did the onset of the Cold War influence global nuclear policy and the urgency of non-proliferation efforts?
 - What role did early nuclear agreements and tensions, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, play in motivating states to pursue a formal non-proliferation treaty?
 - How did competing ideological blocs and security concerns affect the willingness of states to support nuclear disarmament versus deterrence strategies?
-

Current Status and Developments (1965–1969)

- What actions by nuclear and non-nuclear states between 1965 and 1969 accelerated negotiations toward the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?
 - How did the positions of major powers, particularly United States and Soviet Union, shape the structure and terms of the treaty?
 - What were the concerns of non-aligned and developing nations regarding inequality in nuclear rights and obligations?
 - How did the establishment and role of the International Atomic Energy Agency evolve during this period?
-

Security Concerns and Global Stability

- What are the potential risks of continued nuclear proliferation for global security and stability during the late 1960s?
 - How might the spread of nuclear weapons technology impact regional conflicts and increase the likelihood of nuclear war?
 - What are the security concerns of states that rely on nuclear deterrence compared to those advocating for complete disarmament?
 - How can a balance be achieved between national security interests and global non-proliferation goals?
-

Verification and Compliance Mechanisms

- What mechanisms can be implemented to ensure compliance with a non-proliferation treaty?
 - How can the International Atomic Energy Agency develop an effective and impartial verification regime?
 - What challenges exist in monitoring nuclear facilities and preventing the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes?
 - How can transparency and trust be built among states with differing political systems and strategic interests?
-

Legal Framework and Treaty Obligations

- What legal principles should form the foundation of a global nuclear non-proliferation treaty?
 - How should responsibilities differ between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states?
 - What enforcement mechanisms should be included to address violations of the treaty?
 - How can the treaty ensure both non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy?
-

Diplomatic Efforts and Negotiations

- What diplomatic initiatives led to progress in drafting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?
 - What role did multilateral organizations such as the United Nations play in facilitating negotiations?
 - What were the main disagreements between nuclear and non-nuclear states during treaty discussions?
 - What compromises were necessary to gain widespread international support?
-

Preventing Proliferation and Promoting Cooperation

- What strategies can be implemented to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states?
- How can international cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology be encouraged without increasing proliferation risks?

- What role can confidence-building measures play in reducing tensions between rival states?
 - How can states be incentivized to join and adhere to the treaty?
-

Humanitarian and Ethical Considerations

- What are the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, based on historical precedents?
 - How do ethical considerations influence the push for nuclear disarmament?
 - What responsibilities do nuclear-armed states have toward the global community?
 - How can awareness of nuclear risks shape international policy decisions?
-

The Role of External Actors

- What influence did major powers and alliances have on the development of the non-proliferation regime?
- What role did non-aligned countries play in advocating for equitable nuclear policies?
- How can international organizations ensure neutrality and fairness in enforcing treaty obligations?
- What measures can external actors take to support long-term compliance and prevent treaty erosion?

12. References

- <https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty?>
- https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/sitesearch?search_api_fulltext=nuclear
- <https://www.nti.org/search/?fsearch=treaties&f-order=relevance>
- <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis>
- <https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons>
- <https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/npt>
- <https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty>
- <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-on-the-Non-proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons>
- <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/npt2020/background>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons
- <https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons>
- <https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons>
- <https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/the-treaty>
- <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20729/volume-729-i-10485-english.pdf>
- <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/56/24>